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Abstract 
The study analyzed a Korean case in which two commercial banks started 
their operation with different composition of ownership. 
The study has shown that the different nature of the ownership generated 
different assumptions and values in the two banks, and these assumptions 
and values in turn played vital roles in the shaping of different strategies 
adopted in the two banks. The study has also shown that these different 
strategies were responsible for the different levels of organizational commit- 
ment of employees resulting in significant gaps in financial performance be - 
tween the two banks. 
The findings of the study should be used to caution researchers in organiz- 
ation science against conducting exclusively behavioral-or perhaps even ex- 
clusively strategic-empirical studies that focus on a narrow set of possible 
explanatory variables. Thus, the study argued that progress in the field of 
cross-cultural research could perhaps best be facilitated through more inte- 
grative research approaches that cross traditional methodological and disci- 
plinary boundaries. 
190 SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSLh?ESS 
Background and Objectiw of the Study 
Commercial banks in Korea prior to the 1980s were under government 
control, since the Korean economy was suffering from capital shortage 
problems. There were five major commercial banks: their efficiency was 
low, and they had unrecoverable loans. In order to cope with this situation 
and to help the national economy grow, the Korean Government in 1981 
announced a new commercial banking policy, which allowed foreign in- 
vestors to establish commercial banks in Korea. As a result of this policy 
change, two joint-venture commercial banks were created. One, a joint ven- 
ture between a major American bank and several Korean corporations, was 
called the KorAm Bank: in it the American bank held the position of domi- 
nance. Almost simultaneously, a group of Korean businessmen with perma- 
nent residence in Japan, also got together to start a new bank in Korea 
This bank was called the Shinhan Bank: it came under the influence of 
Japanese commercial culture. 
The two banks began to compete in the same market by introducing 
innovative products, services, and management techniques to the Korean 
market. There soon emerged a gap between the two banks in financial per- 
formance. The gap continued to grow. The author of the present study be- 
came interested in the growing gap since the two banks shared many 
conditions in common (such as simultaneous start and competition in the 
same market place) except for the variables resulting from the different cul- 
tural background of their founders and the strategies taken in establishing 
and managing the two banks. 
The objective of this study was: (1) to identify the differences between the 
two banks, and (2) to investigate how these differences affected the perform- 
ance of the two banks. To identify the differences between the two banks, 
this study examined the nature of the ownership and culturally-inherited 
variables, such as the founders' assumptions and their values. To investigate 
how these explanatory variables affected the financial performance of the 
two banks, the study examined the roles these variables played in the 
shaping of employee commitment to the organization and the strategies 
adopted by the top managers. 
The author based his study on published documents, manuals, and other 
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materials issued by the two banks: He also conducted fact-finding inter- 
views, formal and informal, with scores of managers at  various levels in the 
two banks. A hypothesis was adopted and tested. 
The Nature of Ownership 
In creating the KorArn Bank, 16 large Korean corporations joined together 
with the Bank of America. The Korean companies shared 50 percent of the 
stock. The largest block of stock owned by a single Korean corporation was 9 
percent. The Bank of America owned the other 50 percent of the stock, and 
so it took control of the new bank. 
A Korean economist with a doctorate from an American university be- 
came the first President and Chairman of the Board. The Bank of America 
nominated an American as the Executive Vice President and Vice Chairman 
of the Board. A managing director was named by the Korean side, and 
another American was appointed by the Bank of America to form the 
four-member Executive Committee which would make all final decisions on 
major corporate actions and guide the new bank's strategy. 
The founder of the Shinhan Bank is considered to be Mr. Lee Hee-Geon. 
Mr. Lee was born in Korea in 1917. In order to escape from poverty, he left 
Korea at the age of 18 and traveled to Osaka, where he found various odd 
jobs to support himself. He worked hard to get himself through Meiji Uni- 
versity in Japan, and devoted himself to organizing the Korean business so- 
ciety in Osaka. His aim was to help Koreans establish and promote their 
own businesses. Eventually he earned himself the nickname of "the Korean 
Godfathern in Osaka. In 1955 he managed to establish a credit union for 
Koreans in Osaka, and succeeded in developing this credit union into the 
second largest among its kind in Japan by the early 1970s. It was from this 
background that he was prepared to consider establishing a banking 
company in Korea when the market there opened. 
Mr. Lee contacted many of his Korean friends in Japan and asked them to 
join him in this new venture in Korea. They saw that the Korean capital 
market offered a vast long-term potential. Patriotism also contributed to 
their willingness to invest their money in Korea. They said that they would 
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like to use their money, which they had earned with difficulty by overcoming 
Japanese racial discrimination towards Koreans, for the economic develop- 
ment of their fatherland. A score of major investors formed what they called 
a non-resident Board of Trustees, Mr. Lee Hee-Geon was designated as the 
Chairman of the Board, though he owned less than 2% of the stock. The 
Board of Trustees recruited a banking expert as the first president of the 
new bank, and the president in turn recruited senior managers having ex- 
perience in commercial banking to work with him as the top management 
team. 
The difference in the nature of ownership between the two banks was 
clear. In the case of the Shinhan Bank, there was Mr. Lee Hee-Geon 
asserting himself as the owner of the Bank, whereas at the KorAm Bank 
there were only top-level officials representing the interest of the Bank of 
America for their nominated terms. Mr. Lee Hee-Geon, even though his 
stock ownership in Shinhan was less than 2%, assumed responsibility for the 
long-term future of Shinhan. He volunteered to perform the '3D' jobs 
needed for the future of his bank. (3D stands for Dirty, Dangerous, and Dg- 
ficult jobs in Korea. In banking, political lobbying, for example, is con- 
sidered to be a 3D job. ) At that time bank presidents in Korea were either 
nominated or recommended by the Korean Government. Mr. Lee lobbied 
the Korean Government to permit Shinhan to choose its own president. As a 
result of Mr. Lee's lobbying, Shinhan was able to select a banking expert as 
its president 
In contrast to Shinhan, KorAm had no one comparable to Mr. Lee 
Hee-Geon. Even though the Bank of America and their representatives 
owned 50 percent of KorAm, there was no one individual asserting owner- 
ship of KorAm as Mr. Lee had done. As a result, KorAm acquiesced to the 
Korean government in accepting as its president an economist, former 
government minister who had little experience in commercial banking. 
Difkrences in Founding Asumptions 
The differences in the nature of ownership of the two banks in turn led to 
differences in the assumptions of their top managers. KorAm, under BOA'S 
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leadership, assumed that a successful bank should be staffed by the most 
competent and qualified people, who graduated of top-ranking universities 
in Korea, and that these highly competent individuals could be motivated by 
providing American - style economic incentives. KorArn formulated its incen - 
tive system as follows. 
Seventy-five percent of annual pay increases would be based upon years 
of service with the bank. The additional 25 percent would be calculated 
based upon an evaluation of both group and individual performance like 
this : 
1. First, of the total amount of money made available for pay increases in 
any given year 25 percent is set aside to be allocated on the basis of per- 
formance. (This was called 'bonus'. ) 
2. Second, all sub-units (or divisions and branches) are then evaluated on 
the basis of 'Excellent', 'Average', and 'Poor' Record System. Appr- 
oximately one third of all sub-units in a particular classification fall into 
each group. The 'excellent' performing divisions are eligible to receive a 
bonus 20 percent higher than the average bonus for the bank as a 
whole. The middle ranking groups are eligible to receive an average 
bonus that is equal to the company-wide average. The 'poor' perform- 
ing groups are supposed to receive a bonus which is 20 percent lower 
than the company -wide average. 
3. Third, the heads of each division or branch in turn rate their individual 
employees using the same 'Excellent', 'Average', 'Poor' rating system. 
On the basis of this rating, the total bonuses allotted to that division are 
then distributed to each individual. 
Thus the result of the group and individual ratings, when combined 
together, happens to range from 1.2x1.2=1.44 or 144% for an excellent per- 
former in excellent-rated divisions to as low as 0.8~0.8=0.64 or 64% for a 
poor performer in poor-rated divisions. KorAm's founders believed that this 
incentive system would inspire the most competent employees to do their 
best for the bank, and that employees receiving low evaluations would either 
be motivated to work harder or they would leave the bank, making an open- 
ing for new qualified recruits. 
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KorAm's top managers also assumed that since they had recruited highly 
educated personnel, they would not need further training programs. As a re- 
sult, KorArn did not establish any continuing education program. 
In contrast, Shinhan assumed that a profitable and growing bank could be 
developed by recruiting individuals who in the interview process displayed a 
positive human spirit and a desire to help make Shinhan succeed. Can- 
didates who had taken jobs right after high school because of poverty, but 
who had gone on to complete bachelors degrees by going to evening school 
while working during the day, were targeted for selection. These people 
were very often in situations where they were not fully appreciated by the 
companies they were currently working for. Furthermore, to ensure that 
these recruited people would fit well into the bank and would work 
harmoniously towards its goals and objectives, an intensive and comprehen- 
sive eight week training program was developed for all employees and all 
new recruits. The emphasis of this training was upon building feelings of 
warmth and closeness among employees, as well as a spirit of loyalty toward 
the bank and a desire to see it succeed. 
As for its incentive system, Shinhan also evaluated employees, but the 
rewards given to those with an excellent performance rating were not part of 
the annual increases in compensation. To determine who had made an ex- 
ceptional contribution during the year, supervisors were asked to rec- 
ommend their outstanding employees to the President's office for recog- 
nition. The recommendations were based on the supervisor's rating of em- 
ployee's attitude, relations with other employees, loyalty and hard-working 
spirit. Employee's who have been recommended by their supervisor received 
a personal letter from the President thanking them for their hard work, sac- 
rifice and achievement. These employees also received some cash as an ad- 
ditional reward for them to use to take members of their work team out for 
celebration. 
Difkences in Values 
The founders of Shinhan valued the long-term growth of their bank, while 
KorAm's founders valued immediate (short-term) profit from their banking 
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operation. In a country like Korea, where the supply of capital is short, the 
growth of a bank depends on the volume of savings deposits with the bank. 
In recognition of this reality, the Shinhan founders emphasized raising the 
volume of savings deposits. Shinhan founder's strategic emphasis on savings 
deposits can be seen in the questions asked of job applicants during the re- 
cruitment interviews. The central question was: "How do you think you can 
raise savings deposits with Shinhan?" Interestingly, the corresponding ques- 
tion at KorAm's recruitment interview was: "What college did you graduate 
from?" or "Can you speak English?" 
Shinhan frequently held company-wide campaigns to raise savings de- 
posits. There were many moving episodes that came out of these campaigns. 
Here is one of them. On a Christmas when Shinhan management asked its 
employees, "What do you (employees) want for Christmas presents from the 
bank management?" most employees' common answer to the question was 
"A pair of shoes, we have walked so many miles in search of new customers 
to raise our savings deposits that our shoes are all worn out." 
While Shinhan was emphasizing the increase of savings deposits, the 
executive officers at KorAm Bank based their banking operation on the 30 
million US dollars deposited by the Bank of America and exchanged into 
Korean money. They paid little attention to raising savings deposits from 
small and general customers. They even sent all the money received as 
dividends from KorAm to the US headquarters of the Bank of America. 
(The founders at Shinhan reinvested their dividends and proceeds back into 
Shinhan.) As a result, the volume of savings deposits as of 1994 was about 3 
to 1 in favor of Shinhan. With this size gap and the economy of scale coming 
into play, the performance gap between the two banks continued to grow. 
The long-term versus short-term differences in value orientation between 
the two banks could also be found in the strategies adopted by the two 
banks with respect to creating their branch networks. Shinhan founders 
viewed the expansion of branch networks as the most important vehicle for 
the growth of the bank in the long run. On the other hand, KorAm founders 
thought that opening a new branch required a substantial new investment 
which in turn could make the short-term profit unfavorable. Thus, KorAm 
designed a highly centralized organization which was appropriate to perform 
mostly wholesale or industrial banking. KorAm opened a few branches in 
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downtown Seoul where most major corporations were housed. But, these 
branch offices were only allowed to handle retail banking. Industrial or 
wholesale banking activities were supposed to be done at the headquarters. 
Kost loan requests arriving at branch offices must be passed upstairs to the 
headquarters to be reviewed by Loan Appraisal Committee. 
On the other hand, Shinhan planned primarily a retail banking system 
with a highly decentralized structure. At Shinhan the branch offices were al- 
lowed to perform both wholesale and retail activities including export and 
import financing. Thus, Shinhan's business strategy was to open as many 
branches as possible. Their headquarters' attitude was that "we, the head- 
quarters, are here to support branch offices and not to control." It was up to 
the branch to do the job correctly and make a good decision. As a result, 
general customers found Shinhan much easier to do business with, a factor 
not unrelated to the long-term growth of the bank. 
Another area where the contrast between this kind of long-term versus 
short-term orientation could be found is in loan policies. The KorAm's Loan 
Committee looked closely at past performance and the credit history of the 
firm asking for a loan. The concern in this case, like that of most Western 
banking institutions, was on whether or not the loan could properly be 
secured and on whether the individual or company would have adequate 
cash flow to service the loan on a timely basis. At Shinhan bank, on the 
other hand, the guiding principle was to loan on the basis of the long-term 
potential of the enterprise to which the loan was to be given. A venture with 
a determined and competent management team could receive a loan. Fur- 
thermore, Shinhan also provided substantial management services to the 
firms receiving loans. Special management courses and seminars were held 
for the firms to which funds had been loaned. Shinhan also arranged tours 
for the managers of their client firms to travel to economically advanced 
countries to help them learn about how similar enterprises were managed 
there and to have them see the newest process and product innovations. 
Still another area of value orientation contrast was in the policy toward 
the real estate needed for business purposes. Shinhan preferred purchasing 
the real estate to renting it. This preference of Shinhan was quite natural, 
since it valued the long term optimization of the returns from its investment. 
In Korea, with the limited supply of usable land, investment in real estate 
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has been a sure and lucrative business in the long run. KorAm, on the other 
hand, preferred renting the real estate to purchasing it, because the invest- 
ment in real estate did not produce profit in the current or short term. 
Data representing the financial performance of the two banks was col- 
lected from published bank information using government-mandated ac - 
counting and reporting procedures. As Table 1 shows, the financial perform- 
ance data in terms of Return on Assets, Savings Deposits, and Net Profit per 
Employee are almost 3 to 1 in favor of Shinhan. 
Table 1 
Recent Three-Year Financial Performance of the Two Banks 
Return on Savings Net Profit 
Year Bank Assets Deposits Per Employee 
(percent) (billion $ ) (thousand $ ) 
1992 KorAm Bank 0.61 3.515 22.666 
Shinhan Bank 1.02 10.369 42.266 
1993 KorAm Bank 0.30 4.583 10.000 
Shinhan Bank 0.93 14.119 42.400 
1994 KorAm Bank 0.42 6.852 16.266 
Shinhan Bank 0.82 19.917 46.266 
As we saw in previous sections in this paper, KorAm adopted an economic 
incentive system based on American-style individualism, whereas Shinhan 
fostered a stronger sense of corporate farnilism based on Oriental-style col- 
lectivism. It should be argued here that appropriate incentive systems would 
play important roles in shaping higher levels of organizational commitment 
of employees. Organizational commitment is defined as the extent to which a 
person has a strong desire to remain a member of the organization, is willing 
to exert high levels of effort for the organization, and believes and accepts 
the values and goals of the organization(Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). 
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There are research findings which consistently suggest that committed 
workers play an important role in increasing organizational effectiveness 
through reduced turnover and absenteeism and through higher worker flexi- 
bility (Hunt, Wood, & Chonko, 1989: Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). Com- 
mitted employees are self-directed and motivated to work for the sake of the 
organization. They identify organizational outcomes with their personal suc- 
cess, and make conscious efforts to help the organization achieve its goals. 
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) conducted an extensive cross-cultural study 
on organizational commitment. Their primary findings suggest that the high 
commitment of Japanese workers stems from the unique employer-employee 
relationship based on their collectivism culture. When these findings are ap- 
plied to the present study, they suggest that Shinhan's collectivism appr- 
oaches to inducing their employee commitment would have resulted in 
higher employee commitment than would be found at the individualism- 
oriented KorArn Bank. Thus, we hypothesize that : 
Hypotfiesis : Employees at Shinhan Bank would be mre committed to the 
wganization than employees in KorAm Bank. 
In order to test the hypothesis, we used a five-item version of the Organiz- 
ational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) to assess relative employee com- 
mitment to the organization (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1981). The instru- 
ment package was translated into Korean and then back-translated into 
English to verify the accuracy of the translation. 
Data collection procedures were identical for each bank. A total of two 
hundred employees were randomly selected from the two banks and asked 
to participate in the study. They received the questionnaire with a cover let- 
ter explaining the purpose of the study. Demographic data were also col- 
lected with respect to age, tenure, education, and level in the organizational 
hierarchy. All questionnaires were anonymous. 
Of the initial sample, usable questionnaires were received from 170 
employees, or 85% of the targeted sample. This total breaks down into 87 
usable questionnaires from KorAm for an 87% response rate and 83 usable 
questionnaires from Shinhan or for an 83% response rate. 
The hypothesis was tested using separate one-way ANCOVAs. The results 
of ANCOVAs are presented in Table 2 
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Variable 
Table 2 
ANCOVA Results for Employee Commitment 
KorArn Bank Shinhan Bank 
M SD M SD F -test 
Organizational Commitment 3.6 0.6 3.9 0.6 2 . w  
Ns for KorArn Bank and Shinhan Bank are 87 and 83, respectively. 
*p(.Ool 
The hypothesis predicted that Shinhan employees would be more commit- 
ted to the organization than KorArn employees. The prediction was con- 
firmed (F = 2.68, p ( .01). 
Discussions 
Hofstede (1984, and 1991) suggested that cultures could be distinguished 
along five dimensions: 1) p o w w  distance, representing the degree of in- 
equality among people that the people of a culture consider normal; 2) indi- 
vidualism-collediuism, or the degree to which the people of a culture prefer 
to act as individuals instead of as group members; 3) masculinity-femininity, 
or the degree to which the people of a culture value assertiveness, perform- 
ance, success, and competition over solidarity, maintaining warm personal 
relationships, service, and quality of life: 4) uncertainty avoidance, or the de- 
gree to which the people of a culture prefer predictability and structure in 
their life; and 5) shmt-term us. long-term orientation, to represent a culture's 
orientation with either the future (long-term) or the present (short-term). 
When Hofstede(l984, and 1991) applied this model to Korea, Japan, and 
the U.S., important differences emerged across the three countries, as 
shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Country Scores According to Hofstede's Value Survey Module 






Source : Hofstede ( 1984, 1991 ) 
Note: Scores range from 1 to 100, with 100 being high. 
According to Hofstede's data having relevance to our present study, 
Koreans tend to be high on long-term orientation, and low on individualism 
(that is, high on collectivism). On the other hand, Americans tend to be ex- 
tremely high on individualism, and very low on long-term orientation. Other 
cross-cultural investigations using divergent methodologies have tended to 
support these general cultural descriptions for the three countries (Steers, 
Shin, and Ungson, 1989: Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990: Abbegglen and Stalk, 
1985 ). 
KorAm is a culturally heterogeneous organization in which two contrasting 
national cultures- -individualism of the U.S. parent company and collectivism 
of the local (Korean) employees--meet together. Shinhan, on the other 
hand, represents a more culturally congruent organization in which two simi- 
lar cultures--Japanese collectivism and Korean collectivism--are blended 
together. Our hypothesis c ~ ~ r m e d  that the degree of employee commitment 
was higher in culturally congruent Shinhan than in culturally heterogeneous 
KorArn. Cultural congruence in international joint ventures seems to play 
important roles in the shaping of the organizational commitment of 
employees. Researchers have noted that culturally -heterogeneous inter - 
national joint ventures experience difficulties in controlling the attitudes and 
behaviors of their local employees (Geringer & Frayne, 1990 and Eisman, 
1991). These control problems could possibly be alleviated if the parent 
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company managers understood the role culture plays in the shaping of 
organizational commitment of their local employees. 
In the present study, we have also noted that the two banks had taken 
radically different strategies with respect to the number of branches opened, 
loan policies, and most of all the strategies regarding the volume of savings 
deposits. The performance gap between the two banks could have also 
resulted from the different strategies adopted by the two banks. Especially, 
Shinhan's long-term oriented strategy to raise the volume of savings deposits 
with their bank, together with the strategy to enlarge the number of branch 
offices, could be most attributable to the faster growth of Shinhan compared 
with KorAm. 
The foregone argument is based on the following reason: In a developing 
country like Korea, business firms could draw the attention of the general 
public more easily with quantity-oriented strategies than with quality- 
oriented strategies. In other words, quantity precedes quality in the process 
of modernization. Korea has only a few decades of history in modernized 
business, thus, most business corporations in Korea became known to the 
public at first by the size or volume of their business. As a matter of fact, 
most well-known companies in Korea are still the bigger ones. Conse- 
quently, Korean people tend to feel safer or more comfortable when they do 
business with bigger corporations than with smaller ones. This is especially 
true in banking. Shinhan's starting strategy, emphasizing the long-term 
growth of the bank, was not only congruent with the long-term oriented cul- 
tural dimension of Korean managers at Shinhan, but also with the idiosyn- 
cratic behavior of Korean consumers in the market, preferring bigger banks 
to smaller ones. 
Since 1990, KorAm management, in recognition of KorAm's lagging status 
with respect to Shinhan, has been campaigning vigorously to innovate their 
organization and management systems. KorAm also tried to revert to collec- 
tivism -oriented incentive systems, as well as to long-term oriented 
strategies. But with the economic principle of scale merit already in effect, it 
seems to be too late for them to keep up with Shinhan. 
To summarize, the different nature of the ownership in the two banking 
firms in the present study engendered different assumptions and values of 
their top managers, which in turn produced the different approaches and 
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strategies the managers adopted. The different approaches and strategies in 
turn played a major role in generating gaps in employee commitment and in 
the financial performance between the two firms. In conclusion, firm per- 
formance appears in the present study to have resulted from a combination 
of culturally-determined variables combined with several strategic variables. 
Such a conclusion cautions us against conducting exclusively behavioral--or 
perhaps even exclusively strategic- -empirical studies that focus on a narrow 
set of possible explanatory variables. Progress in the field of cross-cultural 
research can perhaps best be facilitated through more integrative research 
approaches that cross traditional methodological and disczplinary bound - 
aries. 
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